Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

The State of Utah v. Rick N. Pursifell : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Walter F. Bugden, Steven Hansen; attorneys for appellant.
David L. Wilkinson; attorney general; Sandra L. Sjogren; assistant attorney general; attorneys for
respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Pursifell, No. 860361.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1247

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

«

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

RICK N. PURSIFELL,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 860361-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION BURGLARY, A SECOND
DEGREE FELONY; ATTEMPTED BURGLARY, A THIRD
DEGREE FELONY; 2 COUNTS OF THEFT, CLASS B
MISDEMEANORS. IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK,
PRESIDING.
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
•A10
DOCKET NO.
8bDS4ol~rja-

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
SANDRA L. SJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR.
The Judge Building
No. 8 East Broadway
Suite 426
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
STEVEN HANSEN
800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

FILED

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 860361-CA

v.
RICK N. PURSIFELL,

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION BURGLARY, A SECOND
DEGREE FELONY; ATTEMPTED BURGLARY, A THIRD
DEGREE FELONY; 2 COUNTS OF THEFT, CLASS B
MISDEMEANORS. IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK,
PRESIDING.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
SANDRA L . SJOGREN

Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR.
The Judge Building
No. 8 East Broadway
Suite 426
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
STEVEN HANSEN
800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

lABLfi-QE-CQHIfiHIS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
APPOINT A DIFFERENT DEFENSE ATTORNEY
DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL

CONCLUSION

3
7
11

-1

XA&L£-SF._&UIB2£1XI£S
CASES-CIIEC
CfllilQtDid_^_GtfifiDf
CQdianaa_^_tJfltXifir

399 D . S . 149 (1970)
660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983)

10
8,

D y f i l - i ^ - C x i S E r 613 F.2d 275 ( 1 0 t h C i r . 1980)

11

£ n 3 l f i - X . a _ l s a a S , 456 U . S . 107 (1982)

7

JaiSfflillfl_y A _lllinfiI»

8

ttcK££_}U_Baitis,

24 Otah 2d 1 9 , 465 P.2d 343 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . . .

649 F.2d 927 (2nd C i r . 1981)

ttflJL£D£-JU-£si£ll£,

4,

717 F.2d 1 7 1 ( 5 t h C i r . 1983)

6

E£fiBl£_YjL_Hfllfc£I» 133 C a l . R p t r . 5 2 0 , 555 P.2d
306 (1976)

4

Sffiiib_XA_Sialfl»

4

6 5 1 P.2d 1191 ( A l a s k a C t . App. 1982)

££al£_JU_EflIfiX.fcJb,
£lfli£_3U_fiXflXt

560 P.2d 3 3 7 , 339 (Utah 1977)

601 P . 2 d 918 (Utah 1979)

£iaXfi_i^_M£dina,

56 Utah Adv. Rep. 1 7 , 18 (19 87)

£*fli£_JU_McHi2al,

554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976)

8
8
7
9

£££Jt£-y..tJ9£l£fiB, 725 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1986)

10

fi-tflifi-Ex-Hflfifl»

3,

6 4 8 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981)

Hnii££l-£tat£S-X A _CfllflbXfl,
flni££d-S£fl£££_xA_IaiLt/
flni££dJ3£aifiS_*a_H£l:fcX»

467 F.2d 973 (2nd C i r . 1 9 7 2 ) . . . .

557 F.2d 162 ( 8 t h C i r . 1977)
674 F.2d 185 (3rd C i r . 1982)

H h i £ f i _ 2 A . H h i t £ , 602 F . Supp. 173 (W.D.Mo. 1984)

-ii-

5
4
5
4

IN TBE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OP OTAH,

1

Plaintiif-Respondent,

i

V.

1t

Case No. 860361

RICK N. PURSIFELL,

:i

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant,

i

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

1.

Did the trial court err in refusing to appoint

substitute counsel where Defendant failed to articulate a
conflict of interestf a complete breakdown of communication or an
irreconcilable conflict?
2.

Has trial counsel ineffective for failing to make

or choosing not to make certain objections or pretrial motions?
JUEiSDICIiQfl
This appeal is from convictions of burglary, a seconddegree felony? attempted burglary, a third-degree felony; 2
counts of vehicle burglary, class A misdemeanors; and 2 counts of
theft, class B misdemeanors.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

the appeal under Otah Code Ann* S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987)•
£TAI£tt£HI_QE_Ifl£-CAS£
Defendant, Rick N. Pursifell, was charged with
burglary, a second-degree felony; attempted burglary, a thirddegree felony; 2 counts of vehicle burglary, class A
misdemeanors; and 2 counts of theft, class B misdemeanors*

Defendant was convicted of the charged offenses in a
jury trial held May 29, 1986, in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Dtah, the Honorable
J. Dennis Frederick, presiding.

Judge Frederick sentenced

defendant on June 2, 1966, to the statutory terms on all six
counts to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to a
0 to 5 term imposed in a prior conviction.

Respondent accepts the Statement of Facts presented in
Appellant's brief.

I.

The trial court properly refused to appoint

substitute counsel where defendant did not demonstrate a conflict
of interest, a complete breakdown of communication or an
irreconcilable conflict when the trial court gave him the
opportunity to articulate his reasons for displeasure with
counsel.

When the court decided not to appoint alternate

counsel, it was not required to ask defendant if he wanted to
proceed pro se or inform him of that right.

It was defendant who

should have requested that he be allowed to represent himself for
the court was not required to presume from his general request
for substitute counsel that defendant wanted to waive counsel.
!!•

Trial counsel was not ineffective merely because

she could have made objections that she chose not to make or
overlooked.

Because none of the matters complained of by

defendant prejudiced him, counsel's performance reached at least
the minimum requirements of competent counsel who identified with
defendant and his defense.

•2-

EDIIJ-1
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REPOSED TO
APPOINT A DIFFERENT DEFENSE ATTORNEY
Defendant was represented at trial by Frances Palacios
of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association.

On the first day

of trial, defendant expressed displeasure with Ms. Palacios
stating that he did not "wish to proceed with Ms. Palacios.••"
but not specifying what he wished to do in the alternative.
Judge Frederick questioned defendant about the matter and
determined that Ms. Palacios would continue representing
defendant.

On appeal, defendant argues that he should not have

been forced to proceed with unacceptable counsel, that the trial
court did not inquire into his objection thoroughly, and that the
court did not inform him of his option to proceed pro se.
Therefore, he asserts, the court violated his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and committed reversible error.

As argued

below, the triad court's decision was correct and defendant is
not entitled to reversal of his conviction.
At the outset, the State agrees that a criminal
defendant has the right to appointed counsel if indigent, the
right to self representation and the right to effective counsel
as defendant notes. £££ £Asu £JtAJte-SU-Hfiad# 648 P.2d 71, 91-92
(Utah 1981).

The issue here is not whether defendant was

entitled to these rights, but whether the action of the trial
court in continuing Ms. Palacios as defense counsel denied
defendant any of these rights.
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Defendant s u g g e s t s t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t should have
appointed new counsel for him when he expressed h i s d i s p l e a s u r e
with c o u n s e l ' s performance*

However, even the c a s e s c i t e d by

defendant do not support h i s c l a i m .

These c a s e s i n d i c a t e that a

defendant seeking s u b s t i t u t e counsel must show good cause for the
replacement, ££SBl£-J^_H.aI]S£I, 133 Cal. Rptr. 520, 555 P.2d 306
(1976); McKfifi_XA_flALlis, 649 F.2d 927 (2nd C i r . 1 9 8 1 ) , and t h a t
the t r i a l court must inquire i n t o the b a s i s for the d e f e n d a n t ' s
c l a i m s , Uni££a_S£flies_X*_fl3JLt# 557 F.2d 162 (8th C i r . 1977);
HUiifi-Y^-HUiifif 602 F. Supp. 173 (W.D.Mo. 1984);

flui£lLJU-S*a±«#

651 P.2d 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); Cfli£ea_££a££S_X A _H£l£x# 674
F.2d 185 (3rd C i r . 1982) .
The trial court in this case did inquire into the cause
of defendant's displeasure with counsel (R. 97) and defendant did
not establish good cause for replacing Ms. Palacios.

Defendant

merely complained that counsel did not tell him about a hearing
on a discovery motion before the hearing date and stated that he
thought she should have told him about the discovery request and
the hearing prior to filing it (R. 97-99) .*

This complaint did

not establish that defendant and defense counsel were "embroiled
in irreconcilable conflict- requiring appointment of new counsel.
£££ Hfifidf 648 P.2d at 92. What was established was that
defendant did not understand the discovery process and the result
was that defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the judge explained

* Notably, there was no hearing on d e f e n d a n t ' s d i s c o v e r y request
because the S t a t e provided everything defendant requested prior
t o the hearing d a t e .
(R. 99-100.)
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to defendant what occurred during discovery•

Defendant did not

allege that the discovery request was inadequate or the response
incomplete nor did he complain about counsel's pre-trial
investigation nor her preparation tor trial nor her proposed
trial strategy.

In fact, defendant did not even hint at anything

that would have alerted the court to complaints other than the
discovery complaint he expressly articulated.

Defendant clearly

failed to establish a "conflict of interest, a complete breakdown
of communication or an irreconcilable conflict" and was not,
therefore, entitled to substitute counsel.

£}£&££, 649 F.2d at

931, fiU&UH9 Uniififl^iflifiS^x-CalSbtfi* 467 F.2d 973, 986 (2nd
Cir. 1972).
Defendant, however, would also require that the trial
judge must go further and inform him that in lieu of proceeding
with counsel, be may choose to represent himself.

The case

defendant cites for this proposition does not inflict such a
stringent rule.

UniJt£fl_£iflJ;£S_3U_Belia, 674 F.2d 185 (3rd Cir.

1982), aside from holding that a trial judge must make "at least
some inquiry as to the reason for the defendant's dissatisfaction," also states that once the inquiry is complete and the
request denied, "the court can then BtflBfillX insist that the
defendant choose between representation by his existing counsel
and proceeding pro se."

Id* at 187-188.

itelty does not stand

for the proposition that a court must in something analogous a
Miranda-type warning inform defendant of his right of selfrepresentation.
examined.

This is clear when the facts of HfiLty are

There, Welty asked the court to allow him to seek

-5-

private counsel to replace appointed counsel or to proceed pro
se.

The court, believing this was a delaying tactic, told Welty

he could keep appointed counsel or proceed pro se without asking
about the basis of the request and without explaining the dangers
of representing oneself*
The Third Circuit in making the statements quoted above
was merely pointing out that a defendant could not be forced to
make the choice Welty made without the trial court first
determining by inquiry that there was no reason to appoint
substitute counsel.

In this case, defendant was allowed to state

the reason for his unhappiness with appointed counsel as required
but, significantly, defendant never requested to represent
himself.

Thus, the court was not required to warn him of the

dangers inherent in self-representation nor was it required to
address the question of self-representation at all where
defendant never raised the issue.
In a similar case, the Fifth Circuit required a
criminal defendant to explicitly inform the trial court that he
wished to proceed pro se clearly and unequivocally before the
trial court must consider that option. M£££nfi_3U_£s££ll£# 717
F.2d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1983).

The court stated:

Moreno's stated reasons for this request were
that his counsel had failed to carry out
certain unspecified requests and that she was
not "helping" him; not that he wished to act
as his own attorney. We cannot infer from
the defendant's general request to the court
to dismiss his attorney that he desired to
waive counsel and continue the trial pro se.
Nor does the trial judge have an obligation
to personally inform the defendant of his
right to represent himself in such
circumstances.
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Id* at 175 (citation omitted).
Because the trial court made a proper inquiry into the
reasons for defendant's request for substitute counsel and
because defendant's reason was insubstantial, the trial court
here properly denied defendant's request.

Moreover, the trial

court was not required to offer defendant the alternative of
proceeding pro se. Consequently, the trial court's ruling should
be upheld and defendant's conviction affirmed.
POINT II
DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective
because she "barely presented a defense."

Be enumerates defense

counsel's alleged failings as: (1) not objecting to hearsay
evidence; (2) not objecting to a witness' reference to another
•robber"; (3) no pretrial challenge to defendant's initial
detention; (4) no pretrial motion to suppress the show-up
identification of defendant as suggestive; (5) not questioning
why no fingerprints were taken; and (6) failure to impeach a
witness with a prior inconsistent statement.

Based upon

counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, defendant requests a new
trial.
Regardless of defendant's complaints, counsel's
performance in this case was, nevertheless, constitutionally
sufficient under the applicable standards.
[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants only a fair trial and a competent
attorney. It does not insure that defense
counsel will recognize and raise every
conceivable constitutional claim.
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Ensl£-X A _Isafl£, 456 U.S. 107, 134 ( 1 9 8 2 ) .

"Decisions as t o

...

what o b j e c t i o n s t o make . . . are g e n e r a l l y l e f t to the
p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment of c o u n s e l • •

£iflJfc£_2-*J3£Clilia# 56 Utah Adv.

Rep. 1 7 , 18 (1987) aliasing Stfltfi_JU_HQQd, 648 P.2d 7 1 , 9 1 (Otah
1982).

Before the d e f i c i e n c i e s enumerated by a defendant w i l l

r e s u l t in r e v e r s a l i t must appear that they were p r e j u d i c i a l , or
in other words, t h a t without the e r r o r s , there was a reasonable
l i k e l i h o o d of a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t .

CQdianD3-2jL_MflIJLiS, 660 P.2d

1101, 1109 (Otah 1983); ££aJfc£-XA_EQLSX£il, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Dtah
1977); a a M B i l l f l J U J u m f i l f

24 Otah 2d 1 9 , 2 2 , 465 P.2d 3 4 3 , 345

(1970); SlSifi-Xx-Sia*, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Otah 1 9 7 9 ) .
In the instant case, given that defendant was found in
the area of the crimes carrying a screwdriver and items that were
taken from the Frampton1s (money, a set of Ford keys and a
calculator key chain), there is no reasonable likelihood of a
different result if trial counsel had raised the issues defendant
complains about.

The Frampton's testified that coins and bills

were missing from their cars and home (R. 116, 145). Defendant
carried $39 in bills (Mrs. Frampton was missing between $30 and
$50 dollars) and $2.66 in coin (Jason Frampton was missing an
undetermined amount of coin) • Mrs. Frampton positively
identified the calculator defendant carried at the time of his
arrest as hers and matched the Ford key to her own ignition key
that was missing from her purse after the burglary (R. 147, 148150).
Nearly all of the objections and issues defendant now
claims could have been raised go to the question of identity.
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Given tbat defendant was found in possession of tbe missing
property, it is unlikely tbat even it all of tbe identification
evidence bad been excluded or impeached defendant would have been
acquitted of tbe crimes charged.

Moreover, it is likely that

both witnesses would still have been allowed to identify
defendant at trial even if their previous identifications were
excluded from evidence. Perhaps trial counsel felt, as a matter
of strategy, it was best to allow the identifications to come
before the jury and use the opportunity to impeach with
inconsistencies to reduce the credibility of an anticipated incourt identification*

Counsel did raise these inconsistencies

before the jury even if she failed to introduce the prior
inconsistent statement defendant alludes to. From the record, it
is impossible to determine whether the witness had actually made
such a statement or whether counsel was merely engaging in artful
cross-examination to imply that the testimony was inconsistent
with previous statements.
A lawyer's "legitimate exercise of judgment"
in the choice of trial strategy or tactics
that did not produce the anticipated result
does not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel.
£fidianna# 660 P.2d at 1109 cijtins SJtai£_5U-McHi£ttl# 554 P.2d 203,
205 (Utah 1976) .
Counsel also pointed out to the jury through crossexamination that tbe officers told the witnesses that they found
defendant in the area (R. 125, 168) and that defendant fit the
general description they had provided (R. 126, 168). She further
brought out the short period of time both witnesses viewed the
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person at the time of the crimes and the poor quality of lighting
available*

These factors could have been used by the jury to

discount the victims9 identification of defendant in light of the
lengthy instruction she offered on the frailties of eye-witness
identification that the court gave in substance (R. 101-102)•
Defendant also complains that counsel did not ask why
fingerprints were not taken at the Trijillo home.

She did,

however, ask Mr. Trijillo whether prints were taken (R. 169)
raising an inference of police neglect and the possibility of an
identity error.

Had she questioned the officers, their response

may have cancelled out the inference by providing a reasonable
explanation such as the number of other fingerprints that were
already on the door from sources other than the burglar.
Even though counsel may also have objected to the
hearsay from Mr. and Mrs. Frampton about what Jason said when he
identified defendant that night, this too was non-prejudicial.
Jason had already testified about his comments and was thoroughly
cross-examined on the issue.

His parents9 repetition of his

comments was merely cumulative at that point and harmless in
light of the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See
CAliiaini3_y*_fij:££D# 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970); S*fl.t£-X.*-itelS2i)t
725 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Utah 1986).
Finally, while Mr. Trijillofs reference to anotner
robber who tried to rape his sister was unfortunate, it does not
appear that defendant was prejudiced by the reference.

From the

record, it was clear that the witness was referring to another
person and an entirely separate incident in attempting to explain
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why he was sleeping on the couch near the sliding glass door that
night rather than in his bedroom (R. 156). Since defendant did
not gain entry to Trijillo's home and there were no sexually
related charges, it does not appear that the jury would have
applied the comment to defendant or the circumstances of this
case.

Had defense counsel objected, she may have focused the

jury's attention on the remark and most likely chose to allow
them to forget it, if possible*
While it is easy in retrospect for appellate counsel to
find things that could have been done differently, the record in
this case reveals that defendant received "the skill, judgment
and diligence of a reasonably competent defense attorney."

Dyet

JU-CtifiP* 613 P.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
Consequently, defendant is not entitled to a new trial.
CQHCLSSlOfl
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to atfirm defendant's conviction and deny his request for a new
trial.
DATED this ^JzfL-

day of June, 1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

X/'SANDRA %>SJOG£EN
(-^ A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
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